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Abstract
This paper provides a two-tier framework for empirically analysing Quick
Response on a product level. The first part of the framework suggests retail
metrics based on the characteristics of Quick Response to allow comparison be-
tween supply chains in terms of their adherance ot the strategy. The second
section of the framework lays out a methodology for quantifying the benefits
of Quick Response by comparing product level performance of Quick Response
products to those on traditonal lead times. The suggested methodology is ap-
plied to data from a large South African clothing retailer as an example.
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Traditionally apparel retailers have sourced their products from external suppli-
ers in developing countries who, due to both cheaper labour costs and the labour-
intensive nature of textile and clothing manufacturing, can produce goods at
much cheaper prices than local manufacturers. This practice creates lead times,
the duration of time elapsed between the order being placed and the supplier
delivering the products, that are often six months or higher. These long lead
times necessitate retailers making buying decisions long before the season has
begun. While this is not an issue in many industries, the demand for fashion
products is volatile and largely unpredictable.
There is a plethora of product-level characteristics that influence demand
such as consumer preferences over colour, fit, style, pattern, brand name and
material composition, all of which are constantly changing based on fashion
trends. Predicting these trends and consumer demand is difficult and forecasting
errors are costly. Incorrect forecasts lead to losses in the form of leftover stock
which have to be sold at marked down prices or, in converse, early stock outs
which represent missed sales. As retailers are forced to order their stock for
each season months before it begins, all of the supply decisions are made long
before they can observe demand. Apparel retailers, therefore, have no way to
react.
The main strategy to mitigate this risk is called Quick Response (QR).
Rather than attempting to improve demand forecasts, retailers implement sup-
ply chain systems that allow them to make buying decisions once they have
more information. Increased levels of communication, facilitated by technol-
ogy, throughout the value chain coupled with shorter lead times due to local
manufacturing create versatile and efficient supply chains that allow retailers
to respond to consumer demand in a way that is impossible with traditional
lead times. Short lead times allow for buying decisions to be made closer to
the season at which point trends are easier to predict. Additionally, they make
in-season replenishment possible, allowing retailers to order smaller quantities
of each product at the beginning of the season and only restock products that
are selling out. If lead times are short enough, new products can be designed
during the season informed by sales data.
The literature suggests that these benefits should, in most cases, outweigh
the increased costs associated with compressing lead times (Garćıa, 2014; King
and Moon, 1999). However, there is no conclusive empirical evidence of this
being true. As a consequence of company data at the product level not being
publicly available, most of the empirical papers, to date, have relied on simulated
data or have compared the performance of QR retailers to traditional retailers
and have been unable to find significant differences. Furthermore, company
level analysis has a number of problems. Firstly, the sample size will necessarily
be small based on the number of firms in the industry. Secondly supply chain
strategies are just one of many company level characteristics that contribute to
performance. Finally, even QR firms often use a mix of Quick Response and
traditional lead times because demand for basic clothing items is less difficult
to predict. In order to control for retailer level variation, a product level per-
formance analysis should be conducted on products with quick response and
traditional lead times both sold by the same firm.
This paper provides an empirical framework by which quick response retail-
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ers can be evaluated to determine how well the strategy is being implemented
as well as a methodology for comparing quick response and traditional products
using appropriate retail performance metrics. Data from a major South African
retailer is used to carry out the methodology as an example. The retailer sources
products locally as well as internationally. Some of the locally manufactured
products have traditional lead times and some are Quick Response. This pro-
vides an opportunity to compare these groups of products on retail metrics to
determine how QR products compare to traditional lead time products.
ANOVA and OLS regression analysis is used to compare the groups and to
test for significant differences first in the theoretical characteristics of QR and
secondly in performance metrics. While this analysis follows as closely to the
proposed empirical framework as is possible, limitations in the data prevent
some metrics from being calculated.
This is the first paper to analyse Quick Response in South Africa’s apparel
industry. From the results it appears that the retailer has successfully reduced
lead times which is a positive sign. Unfortunately, the retailer has not adapted
their buying behavior to capitalize on the benefits of QR. This can be seen by
the low order frequency and high inventory levels of the QR products.
Conclusions cannot be drawn about the effectiveness of quick response as
the retailer is not currently implementing the strategy in full. The negligible
differences in performance between the QR and non-QR products is likely due
to improper implementation.
The paper is structured as follows: section 1 summarises the current liter-
ature regarding global value chains, the South African clothing industry and
quick response. In Section 2 there is a recommended list of metrics that are to
be used to evaluate retailers on their implementation of quick response as well
as metrics to quantify the benefits. The description of the data and exploratory
statistics can be found in section 3. Section 4 outlines the methodology and
models used to evaluate adherence to quick response and test for the benefits.
The results of the empirical work can be found in section 6. Section 7 concludes
the paper.
1 Literature Review
The literature review is subdivided into three sections. The first focuses on
global value chains and the apparel industry as a buyer driven market. Subsec-
tion two is concerned with the implementation and benefits of Quick Response
in apparel retail. Subsection 3 is a summary of the empircal papers in the
literature.
1.1 Global Value Chains
Understanding global value chains in the apparel industry and how the neces-
sity for more flexibility and speed is changing the nature of these value chains
provides context for this paper.
Generally the global value chains in labour intensive consumer goods in-
dustries are coordinated by lead firms that manage globally dispersed networks
of manufacturers. These firms coordinate and control the value chain but out-
source the majority of the manufacturing to offshore firms (Gereffi and Frederick,
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2010). The apparel industry is no exception.
For decades the primary method of competition was through price, allowing
for imports from developing countries to dominate even with the relatively long
lead times. The manufacturing of textiles and clothing is very labour intensive,
has relatively low fixed/start-up costs and uses simple technology. Due to labour
being the primary cost, most global retail and textile manufacturing happens
in developing countries with cheap labour (Tybout, 2000; Gereffi and Frederick,
2010; Staritz and Morris, 2015).
The primary method by which apparel firms outperform their competition
is through their ability to differentiate their product in the eyes of the con-
sumer (Gereffi, 1999). This is in contrast to many other industries where the
main method of competition is through improvements in production methods
or through technological innovation.
1.2 Quick Response
Quick response and fast fashion are terms used to describe a retailer’s ability
to react to market trends and have their supply levels better match the un-
predictable demand. Zara, the largest fashion retailer in the world is also the
world leader in fast fashion (Garćıa, 2014). Traditionally, fashion research has
focussed on predicting consumer demand but due to the high level of volatility
and complexity of the systems underpinning demand for fashion products it is
essentially impossible (Christopher and Lee, 2004). Due to the chaotic nature
of the demand, it is much more fruitful to focus on developing structures and
systems within the supply chain that can respond to demand in real time rather
than attempting to predict it months in advance.
A fundamental requirement of this system is a large quantity of quality data
that is communicated in real time from the retail stores to the buyers and
suppliers so they can replenish stock as inventory starts to run low (Caro and
Mart́ınez-de Albéniz, 2015). Additionally, the business must have a very agile
supply chain that has short lead times, allowing for quick replenishment before
stock outs occur (Christopher et al., 2004).
The primary goal of any supply chain system is to have supply match de-
mand (Fisher and Rajaram, 2000). The fundamental difference between quick
response and traditional sourcing strategies is the ability to implement in sea-
son replenishments (Mattila et al., 2002). A wide range of products are sourced
at low quantities prior to the season at which point there is little information
about consumer demand for each product. Products that are in high demand
are replenished during the season and ones that aren’t selling quickly are not
restocked. In this way retailers are reacting to consumer demand in real time
rather than trying to predict it in advance (King and Moon, 1999). Replen-
ishment orders are based upon reestimations of consumer demand grounded in
sales data and are, therefore, far more likely to be accurate.
The benefit of purchasing in advance is the ability to source the goods from
the most cost effective manufacturer regardless of geographical location. This
is the opportunity cost of quick response.
In season replenishment is only possible with short lead times and is most
effective when buyers have up to date and accurate point of sales data. Tra-
ditional lead times are around 6-8 months which would make replenishment
impossible. In order to react to consumer demand, retailers require lead times
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to be as short as possible. Zara, the industry leader in quick response, have
been operating on lead times of 15 days or fewer for more than 10 years (Barnes
et al., 2006).
However, short lead times on their own aren’t sufficient to allow a retailer to
reap the benefits of a reactive supply system. Replenishment decisions must be
informed by data on product sales. Firms must be able to update their original
estimates of consumer demand for the season by observing consumer demand
for the beginning of the season.
1.2.1 Benefits
Preseason forecasts of demand for fashion products have been shown to be
inaccurate roughly 50% of the time. These errors lead to large losses due to
products having to be sold at marked down prices and forgone sales due to
stock outs. For basic apparel products, for which demand is more certain, there
is far less risk involved in forecasting sales (Fisher and Raman, 1996). Given
that shorter lead times come at a cost, only higher risk ”fashion” products
that have an unpredictable demand should be sourced from suppliers that can
guarantee short lead times (King and Moon, 1999).
The primary goal of quick response is to have the stock on hand more ac-
curately reflect consumer demand. This should result in fewer and less drastic
stock outs and left over stock. Reducing these has a direct, positive impact on
profit as stock outs represent sales that did not occur due to lack of inventory.
Furthermore, since left over stock is sold at a marked down price, sometimes
below cost, profits are clearly diminished.
In addition, the longer a firm can wait before making a replenishment deci-
sion the more information they have to inform that decision and the less likely
they are to make a forecasting error. This is especially true when the decision
can be made after some portion of consumer demand has already been observed.
1.3 Empirical Literature
The vast majority of the literature on quick response and fast fashion focuses
either on the theoretical benefits that should arise from more responsive supply
chains or on the methodology of implementation, taking the benefits as a given.
Although quick response in the apparel industry has become the gold stan-
dard that many retailers around the world attempt to implement, there is little
empirical evidence of its benefits. Part of the problem is that product level retail
data on sales, losses due to markdowns and profit margin are not available to
researchers. For this reason, the empirical literature has mostly been limited to
analysis conducted on publicly available, firm level, financial data.
Firm level studies, comparing quick response fashion retailers to their tra-
ditional counterparts, have been carried out for UK and USA firms. Neither
identified any statistically significant difference in financial performance between
the groups across a plethora of performance metrics (Barnes et al., 2006). These
findings, however, do not constitute definitive evidence against quick response
as the sample sizes are inherently low when conducting a firm level analysis.
Additionally, it is difficult to isolate the effect of Quick Response due to the va-
riety of other firm level variables that cannot be controlled for. Studies of this
kind face further limitations because they are unable to know how strictly the
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firms adhere to the Quick Response strategy and how efficiently they implement
it. A firm that claims to be QR may not in reality be a QR firm.
Nonetheless, most firms who have adopted quick response, still source some
portion of their offering on traditional lead times. Basic products, such as white
t-shirts, that are less subject to volatility and unpredictable demand can be
more safely purchased in advance (Abernathy et al., 1999).
1.4 Contribution to the Literature
This paper draws on previous empirical and theoretical work to suggest metrics
and methodology to evaluate QR implementation at the product level. Addi-
tionally, a framework for quantifying the benefits of Quick Response is outlined.
Finally this paper is the first paper to analyse of the effectiveness of QR imple-
mentation of a South African firm.
2 Metrics
This section contains a list of the retail performance metrics best suited to
analysing the characterisitcs and benefits of quick response. The following is
a template made up of the ideal metrics to empirically test and quantify the
benefits of quick response.
Many brick-and-mortar stores, especially in South Africa, have not yet in-
vested in data management systems. Preference is given to metrics that use
basic data that most companies would record. Due to the limitations of our
data, it is not possible to calculate all of these metrics for the South African re-
tailer. They are still included as they are the metrics that should be calculated
when the data is anavailable.
2.1 Quick Response Characterisitcs
Lead Time
Short lead times are the primary requirement for Quick Response. Long lead
times prevent a firm from reacting to demand and make replenishing stock
impossible. Long lead times make Quick Response impossible. With lead times,
the shorter they are, the more reactive a retailer can be.
Orders
Firms with short lead times do not have to purchase their entire season’s inven-
tory before it has begun. They are able to purchase smaller quantities initially
because replenishing stock during the season is possible due to shorter lead time.
Being able to purchase lower quantities of each product means there is the op-
portunity to stock a wider variety of products. The retailer can then replenish
the succesful products and not replenish the ones that don’t sell.
This means that Quick Response products will be ordered in lower quantities
especially at the begining of the season compared to products on traditional lead
times. QR order quantities should be equal to the minimum level of inventroy
required to support operations until the next order date (Zinn and Charnes,
2005).
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Calculating order quantity and frequency products should give an indication
of whether the extent to which they are Quick Response products.
Average Stock on Hand
Inventory levels are another indicator of whether a product is on traditional
lead times or is a Quick Response product. A direct consequence of frequent
small orders is that inventory levels will be lower on average as well as being
more consistent throughout the season (Zinn and Charnes, 2005).
2.2 Performance Metrics
The following is a template made up of the ideal metrics to empirically test and
quantify the benefits of quick response. As well as the data required to calculate
these metrics. Most brick and mortar stores, especially in South Africa, do not
invest in systems that make recording and analysing data easy. Some of these
we are able to calculate from the data used but many are not possible due to
the lack of reliable/complete data.
Lost Sales
Periods in which retailers are out of stock equate to forgone sales. During these
periods demand is unobserved but we can assume in most cases it is non zero
(Nahmias, 1994). It is clear that these periods represent a loss to the retailer
however quantifying this loss is no easy task. A rough estimate can be made by
forecasting demand based on sales during the time in which there was inventory
available and demand was therefore observed (Mattila et al., 2002). Nahmias
& Smith (1994) recommend controlling for seasonality to improve estimation
accuracy. A problem inherent in this estimation is that stockouts in one product-
colour combination will likely boost sales in others as consumers may substitute
a different item for the unavailable one (Mattila et al., 2002).
Regardless of the difficulty, it is imperative to consider lost sales when eval-
uating the effectiveness of supply chain management. Even utilising a simple
estimate of lost sales is preferable to ignoring them (Mattila et al., 2002; Nah-
mias, 1994).
Average Mark-Down Rate
Average markdown percentage is the mean difference between the planned sell-
ing price and actual selling price. When stock does not sell at its original price
retailers are forced to reduce the price, sometimes even below cost, to recoup
their investment in the inventory. The percentage of apparel items sold at re-
duced price has been as high as 33% in America (Fisher and Raman, 1996).
Unsold products and products sold at lower prices obviously reduce profit.
Consequently, the analysis of the average mark down becomes an important
performance metric to consider.
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Gross Margin Return on Inventory Investment
Gross margin return on inventory investment is a retail metric that measures
the gross profit generated per rand invested in inventory. A product with a
higher GMROI represents a more profitable allocation of corporate assets as
the same investment in inventory leads to more gross profit (Sweeney, 1973).
Additionally, this metric allows for the comparison of products with different
sales volume, mark-up and average inventory levels.
GMROI =




p = retail selling price;
S = total sales;
wc = wholesale cost;
N = total units purchased;
M = value of losses due to markdown; and
I = average inventory.
Gross Margin Return on Inventory Investment - Lost Sales
Gross margin return on inventory investment minus lost sales, a metric proposed
by Mattila and King (2002), is intended to capture the benefits of quick response
by incorporating forgone sales into the GMROI equation. Unfortunately, this
metric requires weekly estimates of lost sales during stock outs.
GMROILS =




p = retail selling price;
S = total sales;
wc = wholesale cost;
N = total units purchased;
L = estimated lost sales for the period;
M = value of losses due to markdown; and
I = average inventory.
This equation takes into account, gross profit, losses due to markdowns,
missed sales due to stock outs and accounts for high inventory levels. All of the
theoretical benefits of Quick Response are quantified by this metric. Comparing
QR products with non QR product using GMROILS would provide an estimate
of the value created by Quick Response (Mattila et al., 2002).
3 Data
Unlike previous analyses on QR and fast fashion, this analyse has the benefit
of using product-level data of a large South African retail firm. This is the
first analysis of its kind in this regard. In line with the dashboard of metrics
described in Section 2, the descriptive statistics of the fundamental variables
and their relationships with one another are reported herein.
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3.1 The Dataset
The data are from one of the biggest South African clothing retailers. The
retailer sells products sourced from two external suppliers as well as their own
locally manufactured ’in-house’ brand. According to the retailer, a number of
the locally manufactured products are on quick response lead times according to
the retailer. The dataset contains information on 288 ladies wear and 142 girls
wear products over a 30-week period during the 2017 financial year. However
not all products are sold throughout the period as some are introduced in later
weeks. Once introduced, all products are in stock until the end of the period.
253 of the 430 products are sourced from external suppliers and the remain-
ing 177 are manufactured in-house. One external supplier provides only ladies
wear and the other exclusively provides girl’s wear. Of the in-house products,
100 are on traditional lead times while the remaining 77 make up the com-
pany’s quick response range. Table 1 below shows the summary statistics for
the variables of interest in the data set.
Note that lead times are calculated as the time in days from the date that the
order was placed with the supplier to the date on which the order was delivered
to the retailer. In instances where two or more orders were placed for a single
product, the mean lead times for all orders are used as that products lead time.
In addition markup is calculated as the difference between selling price and
cost price over the cost price. Average markdown is defined as the total loss due
to selling products at reduced prices divided by the full price value of goods.
Average stock on hand is calculated as the mean value of inventory during the
weeks in which the product was being sold.
3.2 Limitations
There are two major limitations of the dataset. As mentioned in the literature
review, two of primary benefits of QR are reduction in losses due to mark downs
and a reduction in stock outs resulting in fewer forgone sales. The retailer was
unable to provide data on losses due to markdown for the majority of the in-
house products.
The second limitation is that the retailer did not experience any stock outs
throughout the 30 week period. This makes it impossible to draw conclusions
about the relative frequency of stock outs between the groups. This also means
that there were no lost sales due to stock outs. Since GMROILS is simply the
GMROI minus lost sales and lost sales is equal to zero, GMROILS is equal to
GRMOI. Hence, only the latter is reported.
3.3 Exploratory Data Analysis
This section explores the data by analysing the descriptive statistics of each
relevant variable contained in the data set and comparing the differences in dis-
tributions between the groups. Table 1 contains summary statistics describing
the data.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Ladies 0.671 0.471 428
In House Quick Response 0.18 0.38 428
In House Traditional 0.23 0.422 428
1st Selling Week 5.68 5.48 428
Price 219.6 93.14 428
Cost 95 40 428
Number of Orders 1.83 1.46 428
Average Order Quantity 2137 1083.8 428
Lead Time2 130.9 65 428
Orders Per Month 0.29 0.19 428
Average Weekly Sales 27598 34703 428
Markup 0.56 0.036 428
GMROI 1.44 0.857 428
Average Markdown3 0.19 0.23 2964
Average Stock on Hand5 2968185 3227837 428
1 67% of the products are from the ladies department
2 Measured in days
3 The average percentage reduction in price
4 Markdown information was missing for many of the in house products
5 Measured in rand value
The average price of all the products in the dataset is R219.6, which is
relatively low. Lead times are 131 days on average which is approximately 4.4
months. The average markup is 56% and the average markdown is 19%. For the
data set, the mean gross margin return on inventory investment is 1.44. This
means that, on average, for every rand spent on purchasing inventory, the firm
generates R1.44 in gross profit.
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Table 2 displays the means for each of the four product groups.
Table 2: Means by Group
Variable Supplier 1 Supplier 2 In-House QR In-House Traditional
Ladies 1 0 0.70 0.66
1st Selling Week 5.3 5.1 8.5 4.6
Price 275 181.1 185.2 184.8
Cost 117.88 84.32 77.08 78.71
Number of Orders 1.95 1.87 1.55 1.82
Average Order Quantity 2350 1623 2024 2300
Lead Time1 165.4 175 37.6 107.4
Orders Per Month 0.3 0.28 0.27 0.28
Average Weekly Sales 41027 16429 19252 20777
Markup 0.57 0.532 0.58 0.572
GMROI 1.63 1.26 1.27 1.39
Average Markdown2 0.16 0.24 0.153 0.25
Average Stock on Hand4 416472 193572 208138 250346
1 Measured in days
2 The average percentage reduction in price
3 Markdown data was only available for 30% of the in house products
4 Measured in rand value
In Table 2, we see that the QR products were introduced approximately
three weeks later than the other products, on average. The average number of
orders is lower for QR products but as the difference in orders per month is
negligible, this difference is probably due to them being introduced later.
Interestingly, the locally manufactured products have lower average cost
prices than the international supplier’s products. It is surprising because the
South African clothing industry has traditionally not been able to compete
with Chinese imports due to the higher cost of South African labour (Morris
and Einhorn, 2008).
Furthermore, lead times are significantly lower for the two in-house groups,
with the QR group having an average lead time of just 37.6 days. This is to
be expected as one of the requirements of the Quick Response strategy is short
lead times. By comparison, the world leaders in quick response, Zara, have lead
times of 15 days or fewer (Barnes et al., 2006). Supplier 1 sells roughly double
the quantity per product compared to the other 3 groups but also has roughly
double the average stock on hand.
Supplier 1 has the highest GMROI, meaning that on average, a rand spent on
inventory from this supplier generates more gross profit than the other groups.
However, caution must be taken when interpreting the average markdown ratios
as the retailer was not able to provide markdown data for 70% of the in house
products.
Figure 1, contains a scatter plot matrix made up of scatter plots for each
pair of the eight variables of interest, as well as kernel density plots that show
the distribution of each variable. Within each scatter plot, red dots represent
quick response products and the green dots represent all the other products.
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Figure 1: Scatter Matrix
The most apparent relationship within the data is the positive correlation
between average stock on hand and average sales. This suggests that the buyers
are purchasing larger quantities of the goods that sell in higher quantities.
From the lead time scatter plots it appears that the quick response products
have much shorter lead times than the other products. This is confirmed by the
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markup 
shape of the lead time kernel density plot.
The figure shows that markdown is negatively related to GMROI. This is
unsurprising since selling items at a lower price reduces gross profit for a given
unit of inventory.
Contrary to expectations, the quick response products do not appear to differ
from the rest of the products in any meaningful way. Furthermore, there seem
to be no other meaningful relationships amongst the metrics.
3.4 Graphs & Plots
The box plot below (Figure 2) shows the distribution of lead times for each
of the four product groups. It is clear that the quick response product range
outperforms the other three groups. As noted, this is expected given the design
of the quick response supply chain.
Figure 2: Lead Times
Both of the in-house product ranges significantly outperform the external
suppliers, however, the average lead times are considerably shorter for the quick
response group. The traditional group has shorter lead times than the external
suppliers simply because the manufacturing is done locally rather than interna-
tionally.
This confirms that the retailer has, thus far, correctly implemented the lead
time strategy of the QR model correctly. The difference in lead times is the
core feature that allows for this analysis. The retailer must have implemented
the quick response strategy successfully to enable inferences to be drawn from
this data about quick response in general. Nonetheless, this does not negate the
need for improvement in their QR implementation, as shorter lead times allow
for even more versatility.
Figure 3 and 4 display the frequency and size of orders placed by the retailer
for each of the 4 groups. We expect that quick response products will have
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more variation in order frequency as some goods should never be replenished
and others should be replenished frequently. The quick response range should
also have lower average order quantity. The key benefit of short lead times is
being able to order in smaller quantities therefore reducing the risk of having
large amounts of inventory that is not in demand.
Figure 3: Number of Orders, from Supplier, per Month
Figure 4: Average Order Quantity
Interestingly, the QR group does not appear to have significantly smaller
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order quantities or a larger number of orders per month. This may be an
indication that the retailer is failing to correctly implement the quick response
strategy.
The following two box plots (Figure 5 & Figure 6) show the pricing and mark-
up distributions. The literature suggests that there is a cost associated with
implementing quick response because local manufacturing is often more costly.
The South African textile and clothing industries are not globally competitive
(Morris and Einhorn, 2008). It would therefore be unsurprising to see lower
markups on the in-house product groups as costs are likely higher. Contrary
to expectations though, Table 2, above, illustrated that the in-house products
have lower average prices.
Figure 5: Price
Across all the suppliers there seems to be very little variation in the per-
centage mark-up with the majority of products falling within the 50% - 60%
range. The pricing distribution reveals that the majority of products fall below
the R400 price point. This indicates that the retailer is relatively low cost.
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Figure 6: Gross Profit Margin
Figure 7 gives a breakdown of the average markdown of sales prices broken
down by supplier type. However, since the retailer could not provide markdown
information for the majority of the in-house products, it would not be sensible
to draw conclusions about the distribution.
Figure 7: Average Markdown
Figure 8 shows sales grouped by supplier over the thirty-week period, starting
16
in week 12. Sales are highest in the middle of this time period and drop off
significantly at the end. The products sourced from ”External Supplier 1” have
a much higher sales volume as was seen in Table 2. The QR range clearly does
not outperform the other groups in terms of sales. This is surpising because the
QR products should more closely match consumer demand and therefore have
higher sales on average.
Figure 8: Sales Volume Over Time
Figure 9 shows the average value of inventory during the same period. As
expected the QR group range has lower inventory levels at the start of the
period. As more goods are introduced throughout and others are replenished
during the period, the inventory levels converge to the levels of the other groups.
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Figure 9: Stock on Hand, Over Time
4 Methodology
The aim of the following analysis is twofold. The first objective is to investigate
the extent to which the retailer has implemented quick response. By comparing
the QR product range to the other three product ranges, using the metrics
outlined in Section 2.1, the retailer’s effectiveness will be evaluated. In order to
draw conclusions about the benefits of quick response from the performance of
the retailer’s QR product range, it is crucial to know that the strategy has been
implemented correctly according to the theory.
Once this is understood, section two of the analysis can begin. Using ANOVA
and OLS regression analysis, it is possible to test for relationships between the
quick response characteristics, such as lead time, and the performance metrics
suggested in section 2.2. ANOVA statistics determine whether the means be-
tween grouops are significantly different from one another. This is done by com-
paring the groups individual variation to the variation between the groups. As
the question of interest is in the individual differences between the four product
groups, the ANOVA analysis will be supplemented with Tukey’s HSD (Honest
Significant Difference) test which allows for accurate pairwise comparisons of
means when there are more than two groups .
Due to data limitations that have already been highlighted, calculating the
GMROILS is not possible. This is due to the lack of stock outs experienced by
the retailer across the 30-week period. This is unfortunate as the GMROILS
is an ideal metric for quantifying the benefits of QR and, as a consequence of
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4.1 Quick Response Characteristics
The three characteristics that are analyzed are, lead time, average stock on hand
and order frequency. These are all metrics on which QR products should differ
from those on traditional lead times.
Lead Time
LeadT imei = β0 + β1Ladiesi + β2InHouseQRi+
β′3InHouseTraditionali + εi
The linear model above is estimated using OLS to determine the effect that
the different dummy variables have on lead time. It is expected that both of
the in-house dummies will have significant, negative, coefficients as they are
produced locally.
Average Stock on Hand
For average stock on hand an ANOVA analysis is carried out to compare the
means of the four product groups. The aim is to identify whether the QR prod-
ucts have significantly lower average inventory levels. based on the literature, it
is expected that the Quick Response products should have less stock on hand.
Order Frequency
Order frequency is another differentiating characteristic of QR. In order to de-
termine whether the order patterns of the retailer, for their QR range, are in
line with the theory of Quick Response, an ANOVA analysis is conducted. It is
expected that order frequency will be higher for the QR group. The ANOVA
results can be found in section 5.
4.2 Performance Metrics
In order to assess the performance of the QR strategy, markup, average mark-
down rate and the GMROI are analysed. Each metric is used as the dependent
variable in an OLS looking at the difference in QR versus traditional supplier
purchasing methods. A number of controls are used to try and reduce bias,
including the category of apparel, price and lead time.
Markup
Markupi = β0 + β1Ladiesi + β2InHouseQRi+
β3InHouseTraditionali + β4Pricei+
β5LeadT imei + εi
This model aims to explain the variation in markup using dummy variables
for department and the two in-house product groups as well as price and lead
time. The literature suggests that locally manufactured goods are not competi-
tive compared to imports (Staritz and Morris, 2015). Therefore it would not be




Markdowni = β0 + β1Ladiesi + β2InHouseQRi+
β′3InHouseTraditionali + β4Pricei+
β5LeadT imei + β6Markupi + εi
Markdowns are a large source of losses for traditional retailers. Reducing
these losses is supposedly one of the primary benefits of QR. It is expected that
the estimated coefficient on the QR dummy will be negative and statistically
significant. There may be a positive relationship between markup and average
markdown as a high markup could indicate a product being overpriced and
therefore requring a reduction in price to incentivise consumers to buy it.
GMROI




β5LeadT imei + β
′
6Markupi + εi
GMROI, after GMROILS is the best retail metric to evaluate the benefits
of Quick Response. The relationship between GMROI and the QR dummy is
expected to be positive and statistically significant. Lead time is included in the
model to determine whether shorter lead times within the QR product group,
further improve GMROI or not. Markup should be postiviely related to GMROI
as markup influences gross margins.
5 Results and Discussion
5.1 ANOVA
ANOVA analysis is done on order frequency and average stock on hand. The
aim is to test for differences between the product groups. ANOVA is prefered
over OLS for these variables as we are only interested in knowing whether a
difference in means exists.
Tukey Honest Significant Difference (HSD) post hoc analysis is done in con-
junction with ANOVA to produce reliable comparisons between each pair of
means.
The output can be found in Appendix A. Figure 10 shows the Tukey HSD
output for average stock on hand and Figure 11 is the output for orders per
month. Average stock on hand is significantly higher for external supplier 1 and
there is no significant difference between the other three groups. This suggests
that the QR products do not have smaller inventory levels than the second
external supplier or the traditional in-house group.
None of the group means differ in terms of orders per month. This is a
surprising result because we would expect, based on the literature, that the QR
products would have more frequent orders.
This suggests that although the company refers to this product range as
Quick Response, they simply have short lead times. QR requires short lead times
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as well as purchasing a variety of products in small quantities and then only
replenishing the ones that are in demand. Having short lead times is a tool that
allows retailers to reduce stock on hand and therefore risk. However, short lead
times on their own will not improve GMROI or reduce the risk of markdowns.
With low lead times there is no reason to order such large quantities.
5.2 Regression
In this section the regression output is analysed and discussed. Regressions are
carried out on lead time, markup, average markdown and GMROI, respectively,
based on the models outlined in Section 4. Table 3 shows the beta coefficients
and standard deviations for each of the variables in each of the models.
Table 3: Regressions Output (t-statistics in parenthesis)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lead Time Markup Markdown GMROI
Ladies -19.5∗∗∗ 0.0346∗∗∗ -0.0709∗∗ 0.157
(4.14) (0.003) (0.034) (0.104)
In House QR -130.31∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ -0.0033 -0.2063
(5.24) (0.006) (0.07) (0.177)
In House Traditional -61.45∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.0294 -0.0905
( 4.77) (0.004) (0.048) (0.123)
Price 0.000045∗∗ 0.00043 0.0007
(0.000017) (0.00) (0.00)




Constant 181.62∗∗∗ 0.512∗∗∗ 0.125∗ -0.8292
(3.75) (0.008) (0.068) (0.735)
N 428 427 296 427
R2 0.62 0.318 0.039 0.065
F 230.5 39.34 2.300 4.865
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5.2.1 Lead Time
From regression 1 in Table 3 above, it is suggest that the model explains 62%
of the variation in lead-time and that all three dummy variables are significant.
Ladies’ products are on shorter lead times than girl’s, with an average difference
of 19.5 days. On average, the QR group have lead times 130 days shorter than
the external supplier products. Traditional in-house products are also on shorter
lead times than the external suppliers by 61 days on average.
These results are to be expected based on the large difference in means
between the groups observed in Table 2. The result is also in line with theory
as QR products are, by definition, on short lead times. The in-house traditional
products have lower lead times than the external suppliers because they are
produced locally so delivery times are shorter.
5.2.2 Markup
Regression 2 explains 31.8% of the variation in markup and, once again, all of
the coefficients are statistically significant. Products in the ladies department
have 3.46% higher margins. Profit margins are higher for both the in-house
brands. The coefficients on price and lead time are statistically significant but
they are not economically significant. A 100 rand increase in price only increases
markup by 0.45%.
It is interesting that the in-house brand dummies are significant once lead
times are controlled for. This suggests that the difference in markup between the
external suppliers and the in-house brands is not simply due to these products
having shorter lead times.
5.2.3 Markdown
It is clear that this regression model has some concerning results. This is un-
surprising given the lack of data on markdowns for the in-house products. This
has severely compromised the analysis with the model failing to explain even
4% of the variation in the dependant variable. This means that the independent
variables, lead times, markup and supplier type, have very little effect on the
average mark-down. Neither of the dummy variables for the in-house brands
are significant meaning that there is not a statistically significant difference
in average mark-down between the externally and internally sourced groups of
products.
The only statistically significant variable is the ladies wear dummy. Womens
wear products are marked down 7.1% more on average compared to girls wear.
This seems reasonable as women are likely more discerning than girls, who are
less likely to buy their own clothes.
5.2.4 GMROI
The results of the OLS regression on GMROI suggest that the variables are
severely lacking in explanatory power. The group of variables included jointly
explain 6.5% of the total variation in Gross Marginal Return on Investment. The
dummy variable for the QR group is not significant meaning that the group of
products do not have a statistically different GMROI on average. Moreover, the
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only statistically significant variable is mark-up. This suggests that the primary
drivers of GMROI are not captured in the data.
Based on the theoretical benefits of QR, the insignificance of the QR group
found in this model is an unsurprising result. The gains in GMROI come ex-
clusively from reduced inventory on hand. Hence, it is framed as a reduction in
risk and not any inherent improvement in profitability. In fact, often shortening
lead times requires sourcing products from more expensive local suppliers which
should increase costs. From the ANOVA analysis, it is clear that the retailer
does not have lower inventory levels for their QR range. This means they are
unable to capitalise on the primary benefit of quick response. For this reason,
it is unsurprising that the QR dummy was insignificant in predicting GMROI
in the above model.
6 Conclusion
This investigation set out with a two-tier framework to analyse Quick Response
at the product level. Following this strategy, the conclusion will be divided into
two sections. The first covers the dashboard of metrics that are recommended for
analysing QR products. The second will summarise the findings of the analysis
using the South African case study.
6.1 Framework
The literature provides compelling theoretical arguments for the benefits of
Quick Response. There is, however, a lack of empirical evidence to support the
theory. Firm level analysis does not find significant differences in performance
between QR and non QR retailers. Due to restricted access to product level
data, little analysis has been done to compare the performance of QR to non QR
products. Analysis on the product level allows for the company level variables
to be held constant making it easier to isolate the effects of QR.
To determine whether a product is produced by a quick response supply
chain there are a number of metrics to measure. Lead times are the most
important as without short lead times, reacting to demand is impossible. In ad-
dition, order frequency and average order value should be considered as further
requirements of QR. The strategy involves buying small quantities of a wide
variety of products and only replenishing the ones that sell quickly. Quick re-
sponse products should therefore have higher order frequency and lower average
order quantity.
The primary benefits of a more reactive supply chain come from the ability
to match unpredictable levels of demand while keeping inventory levels low and
therefore mitigating risk (Caro and Mart́ınez-de Albéniz, 2015). Quick response
products are expected to have a higher GMROI because average inventory will
be lower due to smaller order quantity. Stock outs are also less likely to occur as
inventories can be replenished as they start to run low due to short lead times.
GMROILS the metric that incorporates lost sales due to stock outs into the
GMROI equation should fully capture and quantify the benefit of QR.
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6.2 Case Study
The move toward Quick Response manufacturing in South Africa should lead
to a number of positive outcomes. Firstly, it will allow local manufacturers
to gain a competitive advantage over cheaper foreign imports as retailers shift
their focus from lowering costs to improving lead times. Secondly, retailers will
likely experience improved profitability and face less risk when making buying
decisions.
The case study in this paper highlights a critical issue for the evaluation of
Quick Response in research. It should not be taken as given that companies that
purport to operate with quick response supply chains are doing this correctly in
reality. This is especially important to consider when attempting to use their
performance to garner insights into the strategy’s effectiveness. A thorough
analysis of a retailer’s adherence to the fundamental characteristics of quick
response must precede any analysis of the strategies effectiveness.
The results highlight that the retailer does not appear to be fully and cor-
rectly implementing Quick Response. With short lead times they have the
means with which to do so, however, they fail to reap the benefits as their ini-
tial order quantities are too high. Lead time compression is not the goal of
a quick response supply chain strategy; it is one of the means by which the
strategy is implemented. Short lead times allow retailers to react to the buying
patterns of consumers. This allows them to buy wider, discontinue unsuccessful
products, have less stock on hand and only restock products that are in high de-
mand. This significantly reduces the risk inherent in forecasting fashion trends
by delaying the supply decisions until such time as demand can be observed
(Fisher and Raman, 1996).
Although the case study was unable to quantify the benefits of Quick Re-
sponse, the framework and methodology have been laid out. The move toward
QR in South Africa is promising as it will likely breath new life into local ap-
parel manufacturing by giving the industry a competitive advantage over foreign
imports while also, hopefully, improving the profitability of retail firms.
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